Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...) it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. (shrink)

This article proposes that social identities are best understood as a kind of affordance, a “social identity affordance.” Social identity affordances are possibilities for action and interaction between persons, within a social niche, based on perceived and self-perceived social group identification. First, the view presented captures and articulates the basic structure of social identities. Second, it explains the multifaceted interplay of such an item in the social field, including not only the complexity of the interpersonal dimensions, but also the multiplicity (...) of registers in which social identities vibrate (ethical, political, psychological, geographical, affective, epistemic). Third, by doing good on (i) and (ii), the view makes social identities intelligible, helping preclude reductive misinterpretations of social identities, either subjective-only or public-only. The view has robust descriptive and explanatory power in concrete social contexts and retains the openness of a historically bound type of formation whose specific meanings change over time. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...) it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Este artículo examina la concepción racionalde Hare sobre los juicios morales.Para ello, critica tajantemente la concepcióne mo t i v i s t a de l o s Po s i t i v i s t a s l ó g i c o s yde St e ve ns on. Tambi é n, s e di s t anc i a de lintuicionismo moral concebido por Moore ensus Principia Ethica de 1903. Para desarrollarel racionalismo moral parte del principio (...) queel lenguaje moral hace parte del lenguaje engeneral, del cual no puede ser desligado puescuando hacemos razonamientos morales estosse encuentran sometidos por las diferentesreglas de la lógica clásica. Por ello, Hare aplicala lógica clásica a su teoría de los imperativosy considera la ética como el estudio lógico dellenguaje moral.También se muestran las semej anzas y lasdiferencias entre la concepción de Austin y deHare, destacando la evolución del pensamientode este último filósofo. Cuando Hare escribiósu obra El Lenguaje de la Moral no estabai nf l uenci ado por l a t r i cot omí a de Aust i nsobre Los actos de habla como: Locucionarios,ilocucionarios y perlocucionarios. Influenciaq u e s e o b s e r v a e n e s c r i t o s p o s t e r i o r e s .Mi e nt r a s Ha r e ubi c a l os j ui c i os mor a l e sen l o l ocuci onari o, Austi n l os ubi ca en l oilocucionario; controversia que nos conducea r e f l e xi ona r s obr e l a i mpor t a nc i a de l apragmática en los juicios morales y a la vezsobre su racionalidad.I n t hi s pa pe r , I e xa mi ne Ha r e ’ s r a t i ona lconception on moral judgements. For this, hecriticizes sharply the emotivist conception ofLogical Positivists and of Stevenson. He alsoaparts himself from Moore’s moral intuitionism,as expounded in Principia Ethica. To developmoral rationalism, Hare starts from the principlethat moral language is apart of the generallanguage, from which it cannot be separatedsince when we do moral reasonings these areruled by the different rules of classical logic.For this reason, Hare applies classical logic tohis theory of imperatives and considers ethicsas the logical study of moral language.I also show the similarities and differencesbetween Austi n’ s and Hare’ s concepti ons,emphasizing the evolution of the thought of thelater. When Hare wrote The language of morals,he was not under the influence of Austin’stricotomic view of speech acts: locutionary,illocutionary and perlocutionary, influence thatwe can see in later works. While Hare locatesmoral judgments in the locutionary, Austin doesit in the illocutionary. This controversy leadsus to think on the importance of pragmatics inmoral judgements as well as on its rationality. (shrink)

A partir del análisis del tercer libro del Ensayosobre el Entendimiento Humano pretendomostrar como encontramos en esta obra deLocke algunos elementos que posteriormentese desarrollaron en la Filosofía Analítica delsiglo XX. Está influencia se presenta a travésdel análisis que realiza Locke sobre el papelque cumple el lenguaje en el problema delconocimiento, lo cual lo conduce a criticarla metafísica, concebir la noción demetalenguaje, analizar las diferentes funcionesdel lenguaje, plantear la noción del sentido ydel sinsentido. Pienso que estas nociones seencuentran en los planteamientos (...) de LockeBy analyzing Book III of An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, I Intend to illustrate how we can find in this work of Locke’s some elements that were developed later in Twentieth Century Analytical Philosophy. I discuss this influence by means of Locke’s analysis of the role of language in the problem of knowledge, which leads him to criticize metaphysics, to conceive the notion of a metalanguage, to analyze the different functions of language, and to postulate the notion of sense and lack of sense.I argue for the view that we can find thesenotions in Locke’s views. (shrink)

What would happen if one morning you wake up clumsy, as if your sense of touch were unreliable, arbitrarily on and off? And what would this clumsiness look like if we could transfer it to the moral sense? The article expounds an interesting analogy between the sense of touch, loosely construed, and the moral sense: just as a sort of consistency is necessary for the sense of touch to do its job, so it is for the moral sense to play (...) its part. Touch enables us to navigate the everyday world of coffee pots and staircases; our moral sensibility comes into play when we act or when we judge our actions and those of others, and plays a directive role in what we feel, how we feel it, and how we react to it. Taking the analogy further, I will suggest that inconsistency causes, in both cases, a certain clumsiness, and that clumsiness is linked to arbitrariness – like the person that helps others in dire need, but only does so on some rainy days. (shrink)

Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...) definition of behavior. I criticize Merleau-Ponty’s individualistic prejudice, but show that his philosophy contains the resources necessary to overcome this bias. I define behavior as a holistic, ongoing, meaningful and Umwelt-oriented intrinsically configured expression of living forms of existence. By looking at cases of animal groups drawn from contemporary studies in zoology and behavioral ecology, I show that animal groups, in the fact that they behave, manifest themselves to be a fundamental form of existence, namely, the social form of existence. (shrink)

What is a philosophy class like? What roles do teachers and students play? Questions like these have been answered time and again by philosophers using images and metaphors. As philosophers continue to develop pedagogical approaches in a more conscious way, it is worth evaluating traditional metaphors used to understand and structure philosophy classes. In this article, we examine two common metaphors—the sage on the stage, and philosophy as combat—and show why they fail pedagogically. Then we propose five metaphors—teaching philosophy as (...) world-traveling, wondering, conducting an orchestra, storytelling, and coaching—that can better respond to the needs of increasingly diverse student bodies. Further, these metaphors find their ground in long-standing beliefs about what philosophy is, how it is done, and what it can do for those willing to engage in it. While no single one of them is comprehensive, we think that these models can help us enliven our own thinking about our teaching and the roles we and our students play in our classrooms. (shrink)

La ilusión de profundidad explicativa (ipe) es uno de los fenómenos que ha despertado gran interés en la ciencia cognitiva en los últimos veinte años. Sucede cuando la persona cree poder explicar un fenómeno mejor de lo que realmente puede explicarlo. A continuación, se hará una reconstrucción histórica de los estudios de la IPE a lo largo de las últimas décadas, dando cuenta de su actualidad e importancia. Primero se presentarán los antecedentes y los estudios fundantes de este tema de (...) investigación. A continuación, se expondrán las investigaciones iniciales (años 2002-2015), y la manera como prosiguió la indagación con cuestionamientos y soluciones a la IPE (años 2016-2021). Finalmente, se analizará la relación entre la ipe, las fake news y el internet. (shrink)

Pretendo mostrar en este escrito cómo para desarrollar su teoría del derecho Hart estuvo influenciado por diferentes problemas filosóficos como: 1. La importancia que le da al lenguaje ordinario, influencia que recibió tanto de Austin como de Wittgenstein II; 2. La noción de textura abierta de Waisman que Hart aplica al derecho; 3. La noción de comportamiento social la cual se encuentra regida por reglas como lo concibe tanto Searle como Winch.

In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of (...) things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception. (shrink)

This dissertation proposes the central elements of a Social Enactive Theory of Perception. According to SEP, perception consists in sensory-based practices of interaction with objects, events, and states of affairs that are socially constituted. I oppose the representational view that perception is an indirect contact with the world, consists of the passive receiving and processing of sensory input, is in need of constant assessment of accuracy, and is a matter of individuals alone. I share the basic enactivist insight that perception (...) is a type of activity, but I depart from standard enactivism on the grounds of its individualistic bias and its limited conception of activity. Instead of motor actions, I formulate the concept of perceptual practices as the appropriate framework to understand perception. Perception is woven into socially informed, contextual, sensory-based everyday activities, such as food, dance, and dress, and even seemingly independent, basic perceptual activities and concepts are constituted by such practices. Perceptual individual interactions instantiate social perceptual practices but are not just repetitions of a script. We perceive objects in virtue of perspectives or appearances, not in spite of them, and on this basis I offer SEPâs take on experience, properties, and contents. I conceive perceptual experience as finely grained interactions between subjects and objects, both of which are spatially, temporally, and pragmatically situated. Objects and their sensory properties are perceived dynamically and always in multiple appearances. Perceptual content offers a pragmatic specification of the perceptual objects in the specific ways they appear to subjects. For SEP, perception is normatively structured. SEPâs perceptual normativity is not a worry about a supposed constant threat that our perceptions be nonveridical, but about the placement of perceptual things in a system of possibilities and expectations, cast in terms of degrees of fulfillment of expectations and in a horizon of pragmatic significance, both of which are functions of the socially constituted interactions between a perceiver and a rich theory of appearances. (shrink)

El lector se encontrará en el presente trabajo con dos capítulos en los cuales se aborda de manera clara e histórica el proceso de codificación europea en el periodo del iluminismo o siglo de las luces, sobre todo en lo que tiene que ver con la codificación en materia de Derecho Penal, en el segundo capítulo se aborda esa influencia del proceso de codificación europeo en el proceso de codificación en América Latina, haciendo énfasis en el impacto de dicho proceso (...) en la expedición de Primer Código Penal de 1837 de la República de la Nueva Granada esto a la luz de los aportes de dos estudiosos y juristas europeos: Cesare Bonesana Marqués de Beccaría y Jeremy Bentham. (shrink)

The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.

En el siguiente estudio se evalúa un panorama con respecto al comportamiento sociológico en un preámbulo tanto antes durante y después de esta crisis social que se está viviendo debido a la pandemia de hoy en día. Por ello para sustentar dicha investigación se realizó un censo en el cuál, mediante el uso de herramientas estadísticas, se pudo realizar una comparación entre un antes y un durante de la pandemia, lo cual facilitaría intrínsicamente a la predicción de una denominada post (...) pandemia. En este texto se pretende detallar el proceso y forma de la encuesta, al igual que los resultados obtenidos de la misma. Se proveen, además, posibles explicaciones para estos resultados, guiándose por las restricciones de salud nacionales como posibles razones para el cambio de comportamiento actual. Palabras Clave: coronavirus, pandemia, frecuencia de salida. Referencias [1]P. Byass, «Eco-epidemiological assessment of the COVID-19 epidemic in China, January-February 2020,» Web Of Science, vol. 13, nº 1, 2020. [2]P. Stefanoni, «Brasil: pandemia, guerra cultural y precariedad,» Nueva Sociedad, pp. 49-59, 2020. [3]M. J. Báguena Cervellera, «La pandemia de COVID-19 a la luz de la historia de la medicina,» Investigación y Ciencia, 2020. [4]A. Levy, «La pandemia de COVID-19 podr{ia ayudar a resolver una gran incógnita climática,» Investigación y Ciencia, 2020. [5]T. Marcel Ariel, «Relaciones en tiempos de pandemia: COVID-19 y bienestar animal, ambiental y humano,» Revista Facultad Nacional De Agronomia Medellin, vol. 2, 2020. [6]F. Manrique-Abril, «Modelo SIR de la pandemia de Covid-19 en Colombia/SIR model of the COVID-19 pandemic in Colombia,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, pp. 1-6, 2020. [7]D. Arango-Londoño, «Predicciones de un modelo SEIR para casos de COVID-19 en Cali, Colombia/Predictions of a SEIR model for COVID-19 cases in Cali-Colombia,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 1-9, 2020. [8]J. Gonzales-Castillo, «Pandemia de la COVID-19 y las Políticas de Salud Pública en el Perú: marzo-mayo 2020/COVID-19 pandemic and Public Health Policies in Peru: March-May 2020,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº2, pp. 1-9, 2020. [9]A. Valenzuela-Cazés y L. Becerra-Ostos, «Práctica clínica, ámbito laboral y riesgos de la fisioterapia ante el COVID-19/Clinical practice, work and risks of physical therapy in the face of COVID-19,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 1-4, 2020. [10]P. Montes-Alarcón y A. Campo-Arias, «Los médicos generales y la salud mental en la pandemia por COVID-19,» Duazary, vol. 17, nº 3, pp. 4-6, 2020. (shrink)

El profesor Patiño logra en este libro dos objetivos claves para el estudioso de la Filosofía del Lenguaje y la comunicación: por un lado, sintetiza temáticamente los principales aportes que se han hecho para que surja y se consolide la Filosofía del Lenguaje y su estudio sistemático sobre los actos de habla o actos de lenguaje que intervienen en la comunicación; y por otro lado, de una manera crítica, actualiza los temas y problemas que se han discutido en diferentes campos (...) relacionados con el tema. (shrink)

Robert Alexy has argued that the democratic objection to judicial review of legislation can be successfully addressed by assuming that judges exercise a special form of argumentative representation. In this article we argue that Alexy does not explain (as he should) under what circumstances judicial review tends to produce better decisions than parliamentary procedure, nor does he explain how judicial review can have a greater intrinsic value than parliamentary procedure. Subsequently, we argue that the intrinsic value of argumentative representation depends (...) on the promotion of citizen deliberation, whereas its instrumental value depends on judges being committed to the rights of discrete and insular minorities in the face of hostile majorities. (shrink)

Ensayos-homenaje en el primer centenario del nacimiento del fil sofo espa ol, que abordan diversos aspectos de la obra de Ortega. Los cuatro trabajos dibujan con rigor algunos de los horizontes planteados por el maestro y respetan la debida modernidad conceptual. la compilaci n estuvo a cargo de Fernando Salmer n, Alejandro Rossi, Luis Villoro y Ram n Xirau.

Macrocephaly is present in about 2–5% of the general population. It can be found as an isolated benign trait or as part of a syndromic condition. Brain overgrowth has been associated with neurodevelopmental disorders such as autism during the first year of life, however, evidence remains inconclusive. Furthermore, most of the studies have involved pathological or high-risk populations, but little is known about the effects of brain overgrowth on neurodevelopment in otherwise neurotypical infants. We investigated the impact of brain overgrowth (...) on basic perceptual learning processes during the first year of life. We recorded high density electroencephalograms in 116 full-term healthy infants aged between 3 and 11 months, 35 macrocephalic and 81 normocephalic classified according to the WHO head circumference norms. We used an adapted oddball paradigm, time-frequency analyses, and auditory event-related brain potentials to investigate differences between groups. We show that brain overgrowth has a significant impact on repetition effects and change detection response in the 10–20 Hz frequency band, and in N450 latency, suggesting that these correlates of sensorial learning processes are sensitive to brain overgrowth during the first year of life. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se hace un breve recuento sobre la mujer en la filosofia y la crítica a la visión patriarcal predominante en la filosofía, en particular se resalta a la filósofa María Zambrano como filósofa del siglo XX y su pensamiento político, como un giro en la mirada de lo que hasta el momento se ha destacado en su obra. Se desarrolla el contenido a partir de una introducción y cuatro apartados, en los que se aborda una reflexión sobre el género (...) como constructo cultural, cargado de sentidos de lo masculino y femenino, y se plantea asimismo la relación con el lugar de la mujer en la filosofía. Luego se centra la exposición en María Zambrano y su filosofía, en la búsqueda de la comprensión de su pensamiento, sosteniendo la importancia que tiene el reconocimiento de su vida y obra a partir de su contexto histórico. En las conclusiones se muestran los matices en la filosofía zambraniana, la multiplicidad de lecturas e interpretaciones que pueden hacerse de la misma. ABSTRACT This paper presents a brief historical account of woman in philosophy and the critique to the patriarchal vision predominant in philosophy. Maria Zambrano is highlighted as a twentieth-century philosopher as well as her political thought, marking a change of direction in the look at what so far has been highlighted in her work. The content, an introduction and four sections, addresses gender as a cultural construct plenty of masculine and feminine meanings and its relationship to women's role in philosophy. Then, the paper focuses on Maria Zambrano and her philosophy, looking for understanding her thought, keeping in mind the importance of recognizing her life and work from its historical context. In the conclusions the nuances in the Zambranian philosophy and the multiplicity of readings and interpretations that can be made of it are shown. (shrink)

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...) mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account. (shrink)

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...) of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...) since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

Ouraiminthischapteristodelineatetheformofsharedagencythatwe take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of (...) shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capac- ities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition. (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.

In this essay I revise, based on the notion of the ‘enlightened ruler’ or mingzhu and his critique of the literati of his time, the common belief that Han Fei was an amoralist and an advocate of tyranny. Instead, I will argue that his writings are dedicated to advising those who ought to rule in order to achieve the goal of a peaceful and stable society framed by laws in accordance with the dao.

The feeling of error (FOE) is the subjective experience that something went wrong during a reasoning or calculation task. The main goal of the present study was to assess the accuracy of the FOE in the context of mental mathematical calculation. We used the number bisection task (NBT) to evoke this metacognitive feeling and assessed it by asking participants if they felt they have committed an error after solving the task. In the NBT participants have to determine whether the number (...) presented in the middle of a triplet corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the two outer numbers (e.g., 07_16_25) with a Yes/No answer. Our results show that FOE reports were strongly correlated with arithmetic errors and numerical properties of the NBT, suggesting that the FOE accurately represents the error. This finding indicates that even very fast metacognitive feelings are reliable when it comes to evaluating one’s own mental performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the occurrence of FOEs is determined by the fluency with which each triplet was solved and the post-decision evaluation processes that occurred after the NBT was solved. Additionally, we asked participants to report their confidence in the given answer for the cases where they did not report FOEs. Participants reported less confidence for the (objectively) incorrect answers than for the (objectively) correct ones, suggesting that in cases where they did not have a conscious FOE they still were able to implicitly detect their errors. Remarkably, confidence was also determined by the fluency of the NBT. (shrink)

Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. Ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of remembering as a cognitive process unfolding within a single subject, as well as traditional understandings of memory knowledge as a justified memory belief held within the mind of a single subject. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psychology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. In (...) this chapter, we attempt an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, taking as our starting point the “extended knowledge” debate which has resulted from the recent encounter between extracranialist theories of cognition and externalist theories of knowledge (Carter et al., 2014; Carter et al., forthcoming). Various forms of socially and technologically augmented memory have played important roles in the extended knowledge debate, but the debate has so far not taken collaborative memory, in particular, into account. We will argue that collaborative memory supports a novel externalist theory of knowledge: distributed reliabilism. Distributed reliabilism departs in two important respects from both traditional reliabilism (Goldman, 2012) and updated theories such as extended (Goldberg, 2010) and social reliabilism (Goldman, 2014). First, it acknowledges that belief-forming processes may extend extracranially to include processing performed both by other subjects and by technological artifacts. Second, it acknowledges that distributed sociotechnical systems themselves may be knowing subjects. Overall, then, the main aim of the chapter is to draw out the philosophical implications of psychological research on collaborative memory. But our argument will also suggest that it may be useful to broaden the standard conception of collaborative memory to include not only the sorts of direct interactions among subjects that have been the focus of psychological research so far but also a range of more indirect, technology-supported and -mediated interactions, and it thus has implications for psychology as well. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

CONTENIDO: Vestigios protodemocráticos en la Edad Media tardía: Marsilio de Papua, Nicolás de Cusa / Matthias Vollet / - La concepción normativa de la democracia: un aporte neokantiano / Rodolfo Arango / - El concepto de lo político y la razón pública en Schmit y Rawls / Miguel Vatter / - Democracia y liberación pública / Cristina Lafont / - La democracia desde la teoría de las emociones / Viviana Quintero / - Ontología y democracia en spinoza y Negri (...) / Amalia Rey / - Reconocimiento y redistribución: el rol de un teoría crítica de la democracia / Nicolás Espejo / - La contribución de Haberman a la crítica de la tecnocratización de la democracia / Luis Javier Orjuela / - Libertad, derecho y democracia: aspectos teóricos y pragmáticos, con énfasis en la competencia / Joachim Lege / - Democracia representativa y democracia deliberativa: reflexiones a partir de la situación peruana reciente / David Sobrevilla. (shrink)

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

The literary genesis of Einbahnstraße by Walter Benjamin represents a very special case of the use of the procedures of surrealism in the philosophical-literary production of the author. The process of evolution of thinking that ended up in the writing of this piece is unveiled throughout the present analysis. This is a sign of both waiver and restart; the opening for a new productive dimension in the career of one of the most important —and misunderstood— philosophers of the 20th century. (...) More than enlightening a small master piece of philosophy from a literary perspective, or analyzing a small master piece of literature from the philosophy, what is being problematized here is the division, cultivated or figured throughout the years, between both disciplines. This work is intended to recover what is insoluble from the philosophical-literary labor of Walter Benjamin, besides tracing a possible reconfiguration for an interdisciplinary field of work to come up and contribute in the understanding of the problem called The Retreat of Metaphor by Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

Patagonia: Land of Giants captures the wonders of the Patagonian landscape in hundreds of stunning color photographs by famed Argentine nature photographer Daniel Rivademar.